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Abstract
We present a comprehensive analysis of the Johnson (like) noise based classical key-distribution scheme presented by Kish [L.B. Kish, Phys.
Lett. A 352 (2006) 178]. We suggest two passive attack strategies that enable an adversary to gain complete knowledge of the exchanged key. The
first approach exploits the transient response of the voltage in the transmission line after the resistors are switched and the second one exploits the
finite impedance of the wire connecting the two parties.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Highly secure communication channels are essential ele-
ments for numerous present and contemplated applications.
Classical encryption schemes utilizing one-way functions offer
only computationally hard security, and therefore, their security
can be compromised, at least in principle.
Quantum key-distribution systems (QKDS) represent a dif-
ferent approach enabling, in principle, unconditionally secure
key-distribution based on the laws of quantum mechanics. Al-
though completely secure, QKDS pose major technological
challenges which limit significantly the key-establishing rates
(< 100 kHz) and the achievable ranges (< 120 km).
Recently, a classical KDS scheme utilizing Johnson noise in
resistors was suggested by Kish [1]. A schematic of the concept
is shown in Fig. 1. Roughly speaking, the security of the system
is based on the inability of an adversary (Eve) to distinguish
between two symmetrical cases (RA = R0, RB = R1 and RA =
R1, RB = R0) using only passive measurements.
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doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2006.07.013We start by noting that the analysis given in [1] for the volt-
age and current noise density spectra, contains a basic flaw.
It completely ignores the finite propagation time between the
sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) and the finite resistance
of the wire connecting them. When the analysis is carried out
taking into account the, inevitable, time delay and the resulting
transients, or the impedance of the wire, we find that the sys-
tem becomes vulnerable to eavesdropping, thus invalidating the
basic premise of [1]. The analysis follows leading to the stated
conclusion follows.
Referring to Fig. 1, we assume that the wave impedance and
length of the transmission line (TL) connecting Alice and Bob
are given by Z0 and L respectively. For simplicity, we assume
the transmission line is dispersion-less. The voltage and current
along the transmission line are given by a superposition of for-
ward and backward propagating waves [2]:
V (l, t) = V +(l, t) + V −(l, t),
(1)I (l, t) = [V +(l, t) − V −(l, t)]/Z0.
At steady-state, because of the random voltage signal gen-
erated by the sources, the forward and backward propagating
waves at (0, t) due to, say Alice’s source, consist of a (infinite)
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series of time delayed signals emitted at t − 2nτ :
V +A (0, t) =
Z0
RA + Z0
∞∑
n=0
(ΓAΓB)
nVA(t − 2nτ),
(2)V −A (0, t) = −
Z0
(RA + Z0)ΓA VA(t) +
V +A (0, t)
ΓA
,
where VA(t) is the random signal generated by the source at
Alice’s end, τ is the propagation time along the TL, and ΓA
and ΓB are respectively the reflection coefficients at Alice and
Bob’s ends defined as:
(3)Γj = Rj − Z0
Rj + Z0 , j = A,B.
When one of the parties (say, Alice) switches the resistor
(and source) on her side, the abrupt change in the boundary
conditions (BC) generates a voltage (and current) wave which
propagates toward Bob. If Eve measures the noise spectral den-
sity at an asymmetric point on the TL (e.g., close to Alice’s
end), she can detect this voltage wave and infer Alice’s bit.
For simplicity, we pick a specific scenario in which for t < 0,
both Alice and Bob have R0 terminate their end of the TL. At
t = 0 Alice switches R1 on (see Fig. 2). The analysis of the
other possibilities is essentially identical leading qualitatively
to similar conclusions. We divide the analysis into two cases:
(1) The signal propagation time along the line is much longer
than the correlation time of the noise generators (or the Johnson
noise), i.e., the system is a distributed system. (2) The signal
propagation time along the line is much shorter than the corre-
lation time of the noise generators, i.e., the system is a lumped
system. The analysis described by Kish [1] is restricted to the
second case and, as shown in the following analysis, this restric-
tion is crucial because it practically eliminates the possibility
of utilizing wide bandwidth noise source such as the Johnson
noise.
2. Case 1: Sources with short correlation time
In this section we assume that 〈VA(t)VA(t ′)〉 = δtt ′W · RA
where W is the scaling factor connecting the impedance of theFig. 2. Determining the exchanged bit by transient analysis of the transmission
line.
resistor and the variance of the corresponding noise source (for
Johnson noise W is given by 4KT ). Because the sources VA
and VB are independent, the overall noise spectral density mea-
sured by Eve is the sum of the separate contributions of each of
them. Using (2) and (3) we find that the voltage noise spectral
density measured at l = 0 (i.e., close to Alice’s end) for t < 0
due to Alice’s source is given by:
(4)Su,A(l = 0) = WR0Z
2
0
(R0 + Z0)2 +
W(R0 − Z0)4
8Z0(Z20 + R20)
,
where in order to sum the infinite series we used the assumption
that the signal correlation time is very short. It should be noted
that the end points of the TL (i.e. l = 0, l = L), are unique
because some of the terms of V + and V − add coherently. At
an arbitrary point l′ along the TL, the forward and backward
waves due to Alice’s source are given by:
V +A (l
′, t) = Z0
RA + Z0
∞∑
n=0
(ΓAΓB)
nVA(t − τ ′ − 2nτ),
V −A (l
′, t) = Z0
(RA − Z0)
{
−VA(t + τ ′)
(5)+
∞∑
n=0
(ΓAΓB)
nVA(t + τ ′ − 2nτ)
}
,
where τ ′ is the signal propagation time from l = 0 to l = l′.
Except for the middle point of the TL (τ ′ = τ/2), the terms in
(5) add incoherently and the noise spectral density generated by
Alice’s source at l′ is given by:
(6)Su,A(l
′) = WRAZ0(Z
2
0 + R2B)
2(Z20 + RARB)(RA + RB)
.
The contribution of Bob’s source at l′ for is evaluated simi-
larly yielding a similar expression where RA and RB are inter-
changed. Note, that for the symmetric case RA = RB , the over-
all noise spectral density measured at l′ is given by Z0W/2, i.e.,
completely independent of the resistors value. This outcome
demonstrates explicitly the importance of propagation effects
along the TL. In contrast with Kish’s result (Eq. (4) in [1]), in
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bit values selected by Alice and Bob.
At a first glance, the last conclusion seems to allow Al-
ice and Bob to increase their key-establishing rate by a factor
of two because secure communication can take place even in
the symmetric case. However, when Alice and/or Bob switch
their resistors (and sources), the change creates electromagnetic
waves that travel towards Alice and Bob and can be detected by
Eve and used to determine the exchanged bit.
Returning to the specific example, at t < 0, the voltage spec-
tral density measured by Eve at some point along the line is:
(7)Su(l
′) = 1
2
WZ0.
When Alice switches R1 on, ate time t , the abrupt change
in the BC generates a voltage (and current) wave which propa-
gates toward Bob at a velocity of Vp = L/τ . This wave consists
of two contributions: (1) The new noise source, associated with
R1, connected by Alice and (2) A change in the reflection coef-
ficient of the left propagating wave (V −) at Alice’s end. Since
the signals generated by Alice and Bob’s noise sources are not
correlated, we can calculate the contribution of each source sep-
arately and sum them to obtain the power density spectra. The
voltage measured by Eve at l = l′ and t > τ ′ due to Alice’s
source is, therefore:
V (l′, t) = 1
Z0 + R1
{
Z0V
A
1 (t − τ ′)
(8)+ (Z0 − R1)V −(0, t − τ ′)
} + V −(l′, t).
Note, that the three terms in (8) are mutually incoherent.
Again, for simplicity, we analyze only the first pass of these
waves in the transmission line (which is the most dominant
one), showing that Eve can learn of the exchanged bit by detect-
ing the change of the voltage generated by these waves. From
(8), the noise spectral density due to Alice’s source is:
(9)Su,A(l
′) = WZ0
(R1 + Z0)2
{
R1Z0 + (R0 − Z0)
2(Z20 + R21)
4(Z20 + R20)
}
.
It should be emphasized that (9) holds only for τ ′ < t < 2τ −
τ ′, i.e., before the reflection of the emitted signal from Alice’s
(new) source from Bob’s end reaches l = l′. The contribution
of Bob’s source to the noise spectral density at l = l′ is due to
the change in the reflection coefficient at l = 0 and is given by:
(10)Su,B(l
′) = WR1Z0(R0 + Z0)
2
4(Z20 + R20)(R1 + Z0)
.
The sum of (8) and (10) yields the over all noise spectral
density measured by Eve:
(11)
Su(l
′) = 1
2
WZ0 + WZ0
2(R1 + Z0)2
{
R21 +
R1Z
2
0(3R1 + Z0)
2(Z20 + R20)
}
.
Comparing (11) to (7) we find that at t = τ ′ (τ ′ after Al-
ice switched R1 on), the overall voltage noise spectral density
measured by Eve changes by a quantity equal to the second
term in the RHS of (11). In addition, because the contributionsof R0 and R1 to that term are not symmetric, Eve can deter-
mine whether Alice switched her resistor from R0 to R1 or vice
versa. Thus, by monitoring the temporal evolution of the noise
density or 〈V 2〉 at two points along the TL (one closer to Alice
and the other closer to Bob), Eve can determine which resistors
(and sources) were selected by Alice and Bob and gain com-
plete knowledge of the exchanged bit.
3. Case 2: Sources with long correlation time
In this section we assume, as in [1], that the bandwidth of
the noise sources is narrow, i.e., the voltage of the sources does
not vary much during the propagation time τ . Under this as-
sumption, the steady-state analysis in [1] is accurate because
the system is practically a lump system. However, when Al-
ice and/or Bob switch their resistors, the assumption of the
narrow bandwidth sources (and hence, the lumped circuit ap-
proximation) becomes invalid. Assuming the two sources are
uncorrelated, i.e., V (A)1 (t) = V (A)0 (t) and V (B)1 (t) = V (B)0 (t),
switching from, say, R0 to R1 generates a voltage discontinu-
ity which propagates in speed Vp towards the other side. Thus,
similar to case 1, by monitoring the temporal evolution of the
voltage at two points along the TL (one closer to Alice and the
other closer to Bob), Eve can determine whether Alice and/or
Bob switched their resistors (and sources) and gain complete
knowledge of the exchanged bit. Note, that unlike case 1, Eve’s
measurement cannot reveal whether the switching was from R0
to R1 or vice versa. Nevertheless, when an identical resistors
scenario (RA = RB ) occurs, which on average happens with
probability of 0.5, Eve can determine the value of the resistors
and use this information to evaluate the previous and subse-
quent key bits.
Finally, we show that Eve can also exploit the finite resis-
tance of the wire connecting Alice and Bob to determine the
value of RA and RB (and consequently the exchanged bit) even
without resorting to temporal analysis.
Referring to Fig. 3, we assume that Eve measures the volt-
age and current at an asymmetrical point along the wire, i.e.,
RW1 = RW2. The corresponding voltage and current noise den-
Fig. 3. Determining the exchanged bit using the resistance of the transmission
line.
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〈
V 2E
〉 = W [RA · (RB + RW2) + RB · (RA + RW1)]
(RA + RB + RW2 + RW1) ,
(12)
〈
I 2E
〉 = W · (RB + RA)
(RA + RB + RW2 + RW1) .
The current noise spectral density can be used to determine
the sum of RA and RB which indicates whether they are identi-
cal or not. For the relevant case, i.e. RA = RB , Eve can use the
voltage noise spectral density to distinguish between the two
possibilities (RA = R0, RB = R1 or vice versa) and determine
the exchanged bit.
As a concrete example, let us consider a key distribution sys-
tem employing a 1000 km long copper wire having a 1 mm di-
ameter. The corresponding impedance of this wire is ∼ 20 k.
This resistance is non-negligible. If Eve measures the volt-
age close to, say, Bob’s side, the ratio between the difference
in the measured noise spectral densities in the two symmetric
cases, 〈V 〉2 = 〈V10〉2 − 〈V01〉2, and the average spectral den-
sity would be:
(13)
〈V10〉2 − 〈V01〉2
1
2 (〈V10〉2 + 〈V01〉2)
≈ 1%.
Such difference can be detected and allows Eve to determine
Alice and Bob’s selection of resistors.
To conclude, we study the security level provided by the
key-distribution scheme suggested by Kish [1]. While at steady
state it is impossible to determine the resistors configuration,
we show that an adversary can gain complete knowledge of the
exchanged bits by using a passive attack strategy exploiting the
finiteness of the impedance of the wire connecting Alice andBob, or the transient response of the system after the resistors
have been switched at the end of one (or more) of the parties.
The vulnerability of Kish’s scheme to the later is crucial be-
cause the transient response of the system cannot be eliminated,
thus preventing Alice and Bob from obtaining any level of se-
cure key distribution.
Although the specific scheme suggested by Kish turns out,
eventually, to be vulnerable to passive attacks, the underlying
idea is interesting and worth pursuing. While classical key-
distribution systems, which are based on other principles, may
not be able to provide unconditional security, they may pro-
vide technological or practical security. Unlike QKDS, classi-
cal systems do not require single photon sources and detectors,
thus allowing secure communication to take place over longer
ranges with greater key-establishing rates using currently avail-
able components and technologies. Such systems may prove
to be both an efficient intermediate solution for secure key-
distributions as well as a complementary technology to QKD,
especially for long haul links.
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